International Workshop on
Scientific Realism 2016

Program

Day 1

Day 2

Abstracts

Teru Miyake（Nanyang Technological University）

"From the Ether to the Earth’s Interior: Realism, Inaccessibility, and the Theory of Waves in Elastic Media"

(Abstract)

The nineteenth century theory of the luminiferous ether has served as a central example in debates over scientific realism (Laudan 1981, Psillos 1999). Although the ether turned out not to exist, the extensive theoretical work on waves in elastic media, which was done with the luminiferous ether in mind, turned out to have been far from a dead end. Much of the theoretical apparatus developed for the luminiferous ether turned out to be applicable to the problem of the propagation of seismic waves—which are, after all, waves in an elastic solid medium. This talk is an examination of the way in which a mathematical theory—in this case the theory of waves in elastic media—is used to obtain knowledge about an object that is not directly accessible. In particular, I will compare the attempted use of this theory in obtaining knowledge about the nature of the ether to its use in obtaining knowledge about the earth’s interior, and discuss implications for recent debates about scientific realism.

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Minwoo Seo（University of Cambridge）

"The Theoretician's Sense of Reality: Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincaré on Theoretical Virtues, Objectivity, and a Sense of Reality"

(Abstract)

There has been an increasing awareness that such early pioneers of scientific philosophy as Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincaré may not be easily depicted as instrumentalists or anti-realists: Duhem's insistence upon the natural classification as the telos of scientific theorisation, and Poincaré's case for structural invariants between epochal theoretical changes, among others, have awoken the awareness. Yet there is another aspect in their positions relevant to this ongoing conversation, which might be called 'the axiology of theorisation', that has largely been ignored by philosophers of science: Duhem's good sense for theoretical unity and Poincaré's aesthetic intuition for theoretical beauty or simplicity. In the first half of this paper, I will offer an explanation of how Duhem and Poincaré related their axiological talks to their ontological positions, in relation to the rise of theoretical physics as a historical background on the one hand, and to Kuhn's discussion of theoretical criteria in theory choice on the other. Then in the second half, I will turn to a broader reflection on why their positions contained such an interesting mixture of axiology and ontology. I will argue that their problematic was strongly shaped by their awareness, as theoretical practitioners on duty, of 'science as a social process' on the one hand – this issue is related to their problematic being focussed on the issue of 'objectivity' rather than 'reality in itself' –, and 'science as a historical process' on the other – this issue is related to their views of the aims of science –. Here, a comparison of their participant's awareness with van Fraassen's constructive empiricist stance is in order.

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Yukinori Onishi（The Graduate University for Advanced Studies）

“Defending the Selective Confirmation Strategy”

(Abstract)

Scientific realists today typically refrain from believing the truth of a successful theory as a whole; they confine the object of their commitment to certain components of the theory and thereby try to make realism compatible with the history of theory change. Kyle Stanford (2006) calls this move by the recent realists `the strategy of selective confirmation' and raises a challenge against its contemporary, reliable applicability. The challenge is based on several historical examples such that scientists falsely believed the truth of certain components of their contemporary theory; given these failures, Stanford argues, it is questionable whether we can reliably identify the true components of a successful theory.
  In this talk, I critically examine those historical examples and argue that Stanford fails to raise a serious worry on the strategy’s reliable, contemporary applicability. In particular, I argue that he should focus on the community-level judgment rather than individual scientists' judgments and, once we look at the same examples at the community-level, they cease to be counter-evidence to the reliable applicability of the selective confirmation strategy.

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Karen Yan and Jonathon Hricko（National Yang-Ming University）

"Defending Case-Based Structural Realism: An Argument from Cognitive Neuroscience"

(Abstract)

Our aim is to develop and defend what we call case-based structural realism, which allows for the possibility that science gives us structural knowledge in some cases, but not in others. We support our position with a case study, in which we examine various practices that cognitive neuroscientists use to map brain networks. These practices include noninvasive techniques like diffusion imaging and tractography, and graph-theoretic techniques involved in the representation of networks. We argue that these techniques give us structural knowledge of brain networks, and that our position makes better sense of this case than other structural realist positions do.

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Timothy Lyons（Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis）

"Four Challenges to Epistemic Scientific Realism—and the Socratic Alternative"

(Abstract)

There are two primary challenges to epistemic scientific realism. After offering a number of clarifications that reveal the force of these challenges, I explore interrelations between them. There are also two secondary challenges, neither of which has received sufficient attention of late. Pointing to these, I also show how they relate to the primary arguments. With the four interlocking challenges specified and clarified, a serious threat to epistemic scientific realism emerges. I articulate my proposed alternative to epistemic realism, a purely axiological—or, as I’ve recently been calling it, Socratic—scientific realism. Central to this position is a wholly realist, but refined, meta-hypothesis about the aim of scientific inquiry: the scientific enterprise seeks, in theory change, not truth per se, but an increase in a particular subclass of true claims, those that are experientially concretized. This meta-hypothesis is put forward, not as an object of belief, but, as in the case of other empirical hypotheses, a tool for further empirical inquiry. Ultimately then, this axiological postulate is directed at the very aim it describes. Indicating ways in which it lives up to what it demands, I seek to outline its promise as an encompassing realist account of scientific inquiry.

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Rei Nouchi（Shinshu University）

"The significance of robustness analysis for scientific realism"

(Abstract)

In recent years, philosophers of science have been focused on a robustness of scientific models. (Hudson 2013) argues against this concept by careful consideration of case studies and criticizes selective (or conservative) scientific realists for using some kind of robustness analysis in their position. For example, Jean Perrin calculated Avogadro constant in many experiments and the results coincided with each other as if it had happened a miracle. Scientific realist, such as Ian Hacking, says this "cosmic coincidence" is a good case for scientific realism (Hacking 1983). In this point, Hudson concludes that it is just a case of “calibration" and the robustness of Avogadro constant is irrelevant to these results. So, He seeks another way to defend scientific realism.
  Needless to say, his argument is not a comprehensive critic for selective realism and has many problems. For example, as discussed in (Worrall 1989), "use-novelty" in a theoretical prediction is an important issue to defend selective realism, but this point is missing in Hudson’s argument.
  So, in this presentation, I examine the relationship of use-novelty and robustness of scientific models, and argue the significance of the robustness concept in scientific realism debate.

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Ruey-Lin Chen (National Chung Cheng University) and
Jonathon Hiricko（National Yang-Ming University）

"Experimental Individuation and Retail Arguments"

(Abstract)

Magnus and Callender (2004) argue that we ought to focus on retail arguments, which are arguments regarding the existence of particular kinds of theoretical entities, as opposed to wholesale arguments, which are argument regarding the existence of theoretical entities in general. However, scientists are the ones who put forward retail arguments, and it’s unclear how philosophers can engage with such arguments. We argue that philosophers can engage with retail arguments by providing criteria that they must satisfy in order to demonstrate the existence of theoretical entities. We put forward experimental individuation as such a criterion—when scientists experimentally individuate an entity, a realist conclusion about that entity is warranted. We motivate this criterion by discussing three cases from the history of science: Antoine Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of acidity, J. J. Thomson’s work on cathode rays, and Humphry Davy’s discovery of potassium.

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Satoshi Kudo (University of Tokyo)

"Pessimistic induction and retrospective judgment"

(Abstract)

One way of responding to the pessimistic induction is to claim that some of false-but-successful past theories were still partially true and thereby successful. Scientific realists hope to find such historical patterns of theory change that if one had believed to be true only those components of past theories that were responsible for their success, one could have evaded the historical challenge.
  But how can realists identify the components of a past theory that were responsible for its success? If they are to judge certain components as irresponsible just because they are no longer preserved in present theories, realists are guaranteed to find their favorite historical patterns. Discussants on both sides therefore assume that realists have to propose prospectively applicable criteria for identifying the working and idle parts of a theory without taking advantage of today’s retrospective viewpoint.
  This talk questions this assumption and argues that realists cannot and need not abandon retrospective judgment. They cannot because only from today’s viewpoint can they justify the superiority of the inductive methods they recommend to the ones past scientist actually used. But they need not because if they are asked to justify their belief, they should refer to all the relevant available evidence, which is the evidence available today, not at any past moment.

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Tomoko Ishida (Keio University)

"Scientific Realism Meets Biology"

(Abstract)

Traditionally, arguments on scientific realism have focused on theoretical entities in physics like atoms and electrons. However, gene, one of the most important entities in biology, is also a theoretical entity which cannot be seen by the naked eye. To explain inheritance, it was introduced in biology as a hypothetical entity whose physical nature was unknown. Today, gene is considered to be a certain area of the DNA molecule and scientists can easily manipulate genes to create genetically modified lifeforms.
  Hacking (1983) shows the process of how scientists had got to accept the existence of electrons. In this talk I will compare it to the process in which the physical nature of gene was revealed, and argue some implications from it.

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Juha Saatsi (University of Leeds)

"Scientific Realism and the Limits of Explanatory Reasoning"

(Abstract)

I critically review some of the key philosophical issues regarding the nature and limits of explanatory reasoning (inference to the best explanation) about unobservable features of reality. These issues go to heart of the contemporary realism debate. Historically speaking, the line between realism and anti-realism has been drawn in terms of a differential attitude towards the explanatory endeavours in science. Some of the principal arguments for realism defend scientists’ reliability in explanatory reasoning. And many have taken ‘explanatory indispensability’ as the key to determining what the rational realist commitments are with respect to our best theories. (e.g. Sellars, Quine, Psillos)
  After a broad historical context-setting I’ll focus on two sets of issues of contemporary interest. Firstly, I will explain the prospects and problems with the use of inference to the best explanation in arguments for realism, focusing especially on the ‘no miracles’ argument. (Boyd, Psillos) One of the key questions here is whether (anti-)realism should be construed as a global or local thesis about science. Secondly, I will explain how recent developments in the philosophy of explanation interact with the scientific realism debate, especially with respect to issues of explanatory indispensability and ontological commitment.

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Supported by Kyoto University